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This study examined whether coach drivers’ perceptions of organisational 
safety climate mediated the relationship between their supervisor’s leadership 
style and a number of outcome measures including self-reported safety 
behaviour, number of accidents and near misses, occupationally-induced 
fatigue, job-related affective well-being, and symptoms of physical strain. 
Forty-nine coach drivers from three companies in Australia completed a 
cross-sectional survey. Standard multiple regression analyses were conducted 
and these revealed that safety climate directly predicted all of the outcome 
measures apart from the number of accidents and near misses drivers 
reported. Transformational leadership was also a predictor of organisational 
safety climate, confirming that organisational safety climate is a mediator of 
the link between leadership style and the outcome measures. Managers who 
emphasise the importance of safety to their drivers and who demonstrate a 
transformational leadership style that shows concern for the welfare of the 
drivers will encourage greater safety behaviour from drivers and better health 





Safety is an important issue for coach drivers. In the last twenty-five years, 
there has been considerable turbulence in Australia's long distance coach 
industry. According to Raggatt (1991), increasing public demand for cheap 
travel and the deregulation of the industry during the early 1980s, led to the 
entry of new bus companies and a marked escalation of competition; so much 
so, that by 1988/1989 two of the largest and longest established national 
operators were experiencing major financial difficulties.  Public confidence 
in long-distance coach was further eroded at the end of 1989, when the 
country witnessed in quick succession, its' two worst coach accidents on 
record.  In all, fifty-six people died.  Vigorous public debate over the issue of 
road safety and the responsibilities of the heavy transport industry followed. 
The psychological health and well-being of coach drivers has been 
an area which has received considerable attention (e.g., Brent, 1998; Krause, 
Ragland and Fisher 1998; Machin and Hoare, no date; Meijman and 
Kompier, 1998). Research has indicated that coach drivers are prone to 
experiencing heightened levels of stress and fatigue which can be expressed 
as an emotional response, a physiological response, or a behavioural response 
(Matthews, 2002).  External factors which have been reported to influence 
coach driver well-being have included adhering to tight time schedules 
during peak hours, lack of sleep due to the type of shift, irregular meal times, 
and difficult passengers (Brent, 1998); bad weather, traffic jams, and other 
road users (Matthews, 2001); traffic congestion, noise, and climate conditions 
(Evans, Johansson and Rystedt, 1999). 
A number of researchers have begun to take an integrative approach 
to improving workplace health and safety (Chu and Dwyer, 2002; Dugdill, 
2000; Ettner and Grazywack, 2001), leading to the development of integrated 
models which investigate various organisational and individual factors 
influencing employees’ safety behaviour and safety outcomes (Cheyne, 
Oliver, Tomás and Cox , 2002; Tomás, Melia and Oliver, 1999). 
Safety behaviours in the workplace are strongly (and negatively) 
linked to the level of workplace injuries (Oliver, Cheyne, Tomás and Cox, 
2002). Oliver et al. examined a model of antecedents of occupational 
accidents that included both general health and safety behaviour as direct 
predictors of accidents. Data were collected from 525 participants from a 
wide range of industrial sectors in Spain. Using structural equation 
modelling, these researchers tested various nested models to see whether 
organisational involvement (e.g., indicators of safety management, safety 
policy), work environment (e.g., working conditions, hazards), general health 
(e.g., anxiety, depression), and safety behaviours (e.g., use of equipment, 
taking shortcuts) influenced the level of occupational accidents directly and 
indirectly. Results indicated a direct negative relationship between the 
physical work environment and general health, and a direct positive 
relationship between organisational involvement and both general health and 
safety behaviour. All four constructs (physical work environment, 
organisational involvement, general health, and safety behaviour) also 
directly predicted frequency of accidents. 
Employees’ perceptions of the organisation’s safety climate have 
been the focus of a number of studies which have shown that favourable 
perceptions of safety climate are associated with fewer work-related injuries 
and greater safety-related behaviours (Cheyne, et al., 2002; Hofmann and 
Stetzer, 1996; Tomás, et al., 1999; Zohar, 1980, 2000). Perceptions of safety 
climate reflect the current priority given to safety in the organisational 
(Zohar, 2003). Neal and Griffin (2002) described a series of studies that 
examined the linkages between safety climate and safety behaviour, as well 
as the role of general organisational climate, leadership factors, and 
individual factors that contribute to safety outcomes. 
Zohar (1980) was one of the first researchers to study the concept of 
safety climate.  Results of Zohar’s exploratory analysis identified seven 
dimensions of safety climate.  These were the perceived importance of safety 
training programs, management attitudes towards safety, effects of safe 
conduct on promotion, level of risk at the workplace, status of safety officer, 
effects of safe conduct on social status, and the status of the safety 
committee. Flin, Mearns, O’Connor and Bryden (2000) examined all 
previously published research that had been conducted to identify the 
common factors comprising safety climate. Flin et al. identified three 
common factors which emerged from their overall summary.  These were 
safety systems, risk, and management/supervision factors. Griffin and Neal 
(2000) identified five first-order safety climate factors: perceptions of 
management values, safety communication, safety practices, safety training, 
and safety equipment. However, these factors all loaded on a second-order 
factor indicating that perceptions of safety climate can be differentiated 
according to the specificity of the items. Griffin and Neal concluded that it is 
premature to propose a definitive structure for the first-order dimensions of 
safety climate. 
Zohar (2002) investigated the relationship between specific 
leadership styles and safety climate. In particular, leadership style was 
assessed as to the degree of concern the leader had for an employee’s 
(physical) welfare. Zohar proposed a leadership-climate-injury model 
whereby a supervisor’s leadership style would influence safety climate due to 
the concern that the leader would have for the employee’s (physical) welfare.  
Furthermore, safety climate was proposed to influence the safety behaviour 
of the employee due to the climate perceptions he/she would have as to the 
importance of acting safely (Zohar).  Four hundred and eleven production 
workers in a metal processing plant responded to a questionnaire involving 
categories of group-level safety climate, leadership, assigned safety priority, 
risk level and injuries.  Leadership was assessed using the Multifactor 
Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ-5X-Revised: Bass and Avolio, 1997) which 
identifies three main types of leadership, transformational leadership, 
transactional leadership, and laissez-faire leadership, a discussion of which 
follows. 
These three styles of leadership can be easily ordered in terms of the 
level of concern a supervisor has for an employee’s (physical) welfare, with 
transformational indicating the highest level of concern  (Zohar, 2002).  
Results from this study indicated significant positive relationships between 
transformational and contingent-reward (one aspect of transactional 
leadership) leadership and climate scales and negative relationships between 
transactional leadership (less contingent-reward) and laissez-faire leadership 
and climate scales. Zohar found that transformational and contingent-reward 
leadership, and not transactional (less contingent-reward) or laissez-faire 
leadership predicted employee injury rate.  Partial support was given for the 
hypothesis that transformational and contingent-reward leadership predicted 
injury rate, and that these effects were mediated by safety climate. This result 
was not found for transactional (less contingent-reward) or laissez-faire 
leadership, as they initially did not directly predict injury rate.  Zohar 
cautioned that due to a small sample size and restricted between-group 
variance, his research may be subject to the decreased likelihood of finding 
significance.  Zohar encouraged further research into the area surrounding 
managerial practice and safety behaviour. 
Barling, Loughlin and Kelloway (2002) replicated Zohar’s (2002) 
results and provided strong support for a model whereby safety-specific 
transformational leadership predicted occupational injuries through the 
effects of perceived safety climate, safety consciousness, and safety-related 
events.  Barling et al. researched 174 participants in the food and beverage 
industry by using ten items from the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire 
(Bass and Avolio, 1997) to assess safety-specific transformational 
behaviours, and ten items from Zohar’s (1980) scale to assess perceived 
safety climate.  As no appropriate scales were identified to measure safety-
related events or occupational injuries, the authors developed their own five-
point likert scale for measurement.  As indicated above, results supported a 
fully mediated model, whereby the effect of leadership on safety outcomes 
was fully mediated by safety climate (and safety consciousness).  In 
particular, injuries were predicted by safety events, and events were predicted 
by safety climate.  Safety climate was, in turn, predicted by safety-specific 
transformational leadership.  Like Zohar (2002), Barling et al. highlighted the 
importance for replication of their findings, as very little research has been 
conducted in this area. 
For the present study, a model of the relationships between different 
organisational factors and individual outcomes was proposed to explain some 
of the risks and hazards associated with coach driver safety.  Based on 
previous research, it was proposed that the supervisor’s leadership style 
would predict coach drivers’ perceptions of their organisation’s safety 
climate.  Both leadership style and safety climate would predict health and 
safety outcomes for coach drivers.  A graphical representation of the 





















Figure 1: Proposed model of relationships between drivers’ perceptions 
of supervisor’s leadership style, dimensions of safety climate, safety 
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Three hundred surveys were distributed to coach drivers with only forty-nine 
of the surveys returned (forty-five were males, one female, and three not 
indicating), representing a response rate of only 16.33%. The majority of 
drivers (approx. 78%) were aged between forty and sixty. The majority of 
drivers (approx 53%) had been in their current position for five years or 
more, with many of those drivers having worked in their current position for 
nine years or more. Approximately 80% of the drivers worked between forty 
and sixty hours a week, with a further 10% of drivers reporting that they 
work over sixty hours a week. Of particular interest to this study, the vast 
majority (approx. 73%) of drivers reported no collisions or near misses. Five 
reported having had one collision or near miss, three reported having had two 
collisions or near misses, while five reported having had three or more 




A cross-sectional survey was used for this study and included demographic 
questions and the measures outlined in the following sections.    
Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ-5X-Revised: Bass and 
Avolio, 1997).  This section of the questionnaire asked about employees’ 
perceptions of their supervisor’s leadership style, based on the employee’s 
judgement of how frequently their supervisor engages in certain activities.  It 
is a 45-item questionnaire that asks employees to rate on a five point scale 
how frequently each statement applies to their supervisor, such as “Fails to 
intervene when problems become serious”, or “Provides me with assistance 
in exchange for my efforts”.  Ratings range from “Not at all”, to “Frequently, 
if not always”.  Results from this section define the perceived leadership style 
of the supervisor as being transformational, transactional, or laissez-faire. 
Coefficient alpha reliability for the three main scales ranged from .71 for 
transactional leadership to .97 for transformational leadership. 
Organisational Safety Climate (Griffin and Neal, 2000).  Sixteen items 
were included that assessed the safety climate of the organization.  The 
dimensions of safety climate that are measured include: Management Values, 
Safety Communication, Personnel Training, and Safety Systems. Four 
questions assessed perceptions of Management Values (e.g., Management is 
concerned for the safety of employees), five questions assessed perceptions 
of Safety Communication (e.g., There is frequent communication about 
safety issues in this workplace), four questions assessed perceptions of Safety 
Training (e.g., Safety issues are given a high priority in training programs), 
and three questions assessed perceptions of Safety Systems (e.g., Safety 
procedures and practices are sufficient to prevent incidents occurring). The 
five-point response scale ranged from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. 
The respective Cronbach alpha reliability coefficients were .90, .87, .91, and 
.82. 
Safety Behaviour at Work (Griffin and Neal, 2000).  This subscale 
comprises eight questions concerning how employees usually behave when at 
work.  It asks respondents to indicate how often they usually engage in 
certain activities when driving (e.g., I ensure the highest levels of safety 
when I carry out my job, or I put in extra effort to improve the safety of the 
workplace).  Employees respond to each item by answering how often they 
engage in the behaviours on a 5-point scale from “Never” to “Extremely 
Often”. The Cronbach alpha reliability coefficient for this scale was .80. 
Need for Recovery Scale (NR; Van Veldhoven & Meijman, 1994).  
The Need for Recovery Scale is an 11-item questionnaire that assesses an 
employee’s occupationally-induced fatigue level.  Essentially, it is an 
indication of an employee’s need for some form of recovery after working.  
The items are all statements that require a “yes” or “no” response, and 
include statements such as “My job causes me to feel rather exhausted at the 
end of a working day”, or “I find it hard to show interest in other people 
when I have just arrived home from work”. The Cronbach alpha reliability 
coefficient for this scale was .88. 
Job-Related Affective Well-Being Scale (JAWS: Van Katwyk, Fox, 
Spector and Kelloway, 2000).  This section provided a measure of how often 
employees felt certain emotional reactions as a result of some particular 
aspect of their job.  These emotions may have been a reaction to co-workers, 
a supervisor, passengers, or even the work itself.  The scale was designed to 
assess individuals’ emotional reactions to their job along the dimensions of 
pleasurableness (i.e., pleasure – displeasure) and arousal (high and low).  The 
30 items ask employees to respond on a 5-point scale how often they have 
felt a particular emotion in the past 30 days, with items such as “My job 
made me feel energetic”, or “My job made me feel intimidated”. The 
Cronbach alpha reliability coefficient for this scale was .96. 
Physical Symptoms Inventory (Spector and Jex, 1998).  This subscale 
asked the employee if they had experienced a range of physical health 
symptoms in the past month, and whether they sought medical treatment 
from a doctor.  The inventory used 18 symptoms involving discomfort, such 
as chest pain, headache, fever, trouble sleeping.  It did not incorporate 
symptoms that cannot be directly experienced by the individual, e.g. high 
blood pressure.  
The Number of accidents and near misses was assessed by one of the 
demographic questions which asked drivers to indicate the number of 





A total of eleven Australian coach companies were contacted regarding the 
research.  Only three of the eleven companies were willing to participate in 
the survey and were subsequently sent survey packages to be distributed 
among their coach drivers.  Each survey packet contained a cover letter 
explaining the aims of the study, a consent form explaining about 
confidentiality and anonymity of responses, the survey, and a reply-paid 
envelope. 
Approximately two weeks after the survey distribution, a follow-up 
phone call was made to each organization in an attempt to increase the 
response rate.  The final response rate was a low 16%.  This response is only 
half that of the expected response rate of 30% for mailed surveys 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).   
The drivers were advised through their information packages that 
participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw from the study at 
any time.  They were also assured that their responses would remain 
confidential and anonymous and that no individual results would be reported.  
A contact number for the researcher was provided on the consent form so 
respondents could make inquiries about the study if they wished.  Upon 
receipt of the surveys, the consent forms were detached to ensure 





In order to assess which of the organisational factors was able to predict the 
two safety outcomes, each of these outcomes was regressed on the three 
measures of supervisors’ leadership styles as well as the total of the safety 
climate scale. The results are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Regression of safety behaviour at work and number of 
accidents and near misses on the four predictor variables. 
 Dependent Variable 
Predictors Safety Behaviour at 
Work 
Number of Accidents 
and Near Misses 
 β t sr β t sr 
1. Transformation
-al Leadership 
.29 1.39 .20 -.03 -.12 -.02 
2. Transactional 
Leadership 
.00 .00 .00 -.04 -.19 -.03 
3. Laissez-Faire 
Leadership 
.15 .68 .10 .02 .07 .01 
4. Organisational 
Safety Climate 
.18 1.07 .15 -.19 -1.11 -.16 
After all variables 
were entered: 
R2 = .13, Adj. R2 = .05, 
F(4,44) = 1.70, NS 
R2 = .05, Adj. R2 = .00, 
F(4,44) = .57, NS 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. sr = semi-partial correlation. 
 
The results of these regression analyses show that none of the four 
predictors was able to significantly predict either of the two safety outcomes 
when all predictor variables were entered simultaneously. An examination of 
the correlations between the predictors and the outcomes confirmed that 
Number of Accidents and Near Misses was not correlated with any of the 
predictor variables, although it was correlated significantly with Safety 
Behaviour at Work (r = -.43, p < .01). In other words, where drivers reported 
that they behaved more safely, they also reported fewer accidents and near 
misses. Safety Behaviour at Work was also significantly correlated with 
Transformational Leadership (r = .31, p < .05) and with Organisational 
Safety Climate (r = .29, p < .05). Therefore, the lack of significant results in 
the regression analyses for these two predictors can be explained by the fact 
that both were entered at the same step and therefore the test of significance 
was quite stringent (that is, what did each variable contribute after all of the 
other variables were entered?). If Organisational Safety Climate is entered at 
step 1, followed by the three leadership variables at step 2, then 
Organisational Safety Climate is a significant predictor of Safety Behaviour 
at Work (β = .29, t = 2.06, p < .05). If Organisational Safety Climate is then 
regressed on the three leadership variables, we find that Transformational 
Leadership is a significant predictor of Organisational Safety Climate (β = 
.45, t = 2.59, p < .05). Therefore, part of the model in Figure 1 is supported 
with Transformational Leadership predicting Organisational Safety Climate 
and Organisational Safety Climate predicting Safety Behaviour at Work 
(which is also correlated with Number of Accidents and Near Misses). 
However, the unique variance (i.e., sr2) that Organisational Safety Climate 
accounts for in each of the two safety outcomes is quite low (2-3%). 
In order to assess which of the organisational factors was able to 
predict the three measures of health status, each of these outcomes was 
regressed on the three measures of supervisors’ leadership styles as well as 
the total of the safety climate scale. The results are presented in Table 2. 
The results of these regression analyses show that Organisational 
Safety Climate was able to significantly predict both Need for Recovery (β = 
-.58, t = -4.02, p < .001) and Job-Related Affective Well-Being (β = .57, t = 
3.92, p < .001) when all predictor variables were entered simultaneously. An 
examination of the correlations between the predictors and the outcomes 
showed that Number of Physical Symptoms was significantly correlated with 
Organisational Safety Climate (r = -.35, p < .05). Therefore, the lack of 
significant results in the regression analyses where this predictor did not 
significantly predict Number of Physical Symptoms can again be explained 
by the fact that it was entered at the same step with the three leadership 
variables and therefore the test of significance was quite stringent (that is, 
what did each variable contribute after all of the other variables were 
entered?). If Organisational Safety Climate is entered at step 1, followed by 
the three leadership variables at step 2, then Organisational Safety Climate is 
also a significant predictor of Number of Physical Symptoms (β = -.35, t = 
2.55, p < .05). Entering Organisational Safety Climate by itself at step 1 
when predicting Need for Recovery results in a similar regression coefficient 
as before (β = -.54, t = -4.43, p < .001), while entering Organisational Safety 
Climate by itself at step 1 when predicting Job-Related Affective Well-Being 
also results in a similar regression coefficient to the one previously obtained 
(β = .56, t = 4.62, p < .001). Therefore, the part of the model in Figure 1 in 
which Organisational Safety Climate predicts the three measures of health 
status was supported (and, in addition, these three measures were also 
significantly correlated with one another). The unique variance (i.e., sr2) that 
Organisational Safety Climate accounts for in each of the three health 
outcomes is much higher (24% and 23% for Need for Recovery and Job-
Related Affective Well-Being, falling to 7% for Number of Physical 
Symptoms). 
The revised model which is depicted in Figure 2 shows which 






















* p < .05, *** p < .001 
Figure 2: Revised model of relationships between supervisor’s 
transformational leadership style, organisational safety climate, safety 
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Table 2: Regression of need for recovery, job-related affective well-being and number of physical symptoms on the four predictor 
variables. 
 Dependent Variable 
Predictors Need for Recovery Job-Related Affective Well-
Being 
Number of Physical Symptoms 
 β t sr β t sr β t sr 
1. Transformational 
Leadership 
.14 .80 .10 -.01 -.07 -.01 -.05 -.25 -.03 
2. Transactional 
Leadership 
.12 .70 .08 -.16 -.95 -.12 .01 .06 .01 
3. Laissez-Faire 
Leadership 
.16 .81 .10 -.04 -.18 -.02 .05 .22 .03 
4. Organisational 
Safety Climate 
-.58 -4.02*** -.49 .57 3.92*** .48 -.31 -1.82 -.26 
After all variables were 
entered: 
R2 = .35, Adj. R2 = .29, F(4,44) 
= 5.98, p < .001 
R2 = .35, Adj. R2 = .29, F(4,44) 
= 5.79, p < .001 
R2 = .13, Adj. R2 = .05, F(4,44) 
= 1.62, NS 





The first regression analysis examined the relationships between the four 
predictor variables and the safety-related outcomes, that is, safety behaviour 
and number of accidents and near misses. Organisational safety climate 
predicted safety behaviour at work (which was also correlated with number 
of accidents and near misses). In addition, transformational leadership 
predicted overall organisational safety climate. The second regression 
analysis focused on the relationships between the four predictor variables and 
the indices of driver health. Organisational safety climate also predicted all 
three health outcomes. In particular, organisational safety climate uniquely 
accounted for much more of the variance in the three health outcomes (24% 
and 23% for Need for Recovery and Job-Related Affective Well-Being, 
falling to 7% for Number of Physical Symptoms) than what it accounted for 
in the safety outcomes (2-3%). This result suggests that additional variables 
need to be included in the model. For example, Neal and Griffin (2002), 
proposed that safety knowledge and motivation would be mediators of the 
link between safety climate and safety behaviour. Dalziel and Job (1997) in a 
study of taxi drivers found that aggression and risk-taking intentions were 
two specific individual factors influential in predicting drivers’ accident 
involvement. Machin and De Souza (2004) found that aversion to risk-taking 
was a negative predictor of unsafe behaviours such as cutting across traffic to 
get to someone who was hailing a taxi, even when there is a slight risk of an 
accident, ignoring safety regulations to get the job done, and running a red 
light. 
The current study has emphasised the role of organisational factors 
(such as supervisory leadership style and organisational safety climate) in 
understanding the determinants of occupationally-induced fatigue, perceived 
health status and safety behaviour of coach drivers. While individual coping 
strategies that drivers adopt will influence their responses to occupational risk 
factors, it is also necessary to emphasise the important role that the company 
management plays in creating and maintaining a satisfactory safety climate in 
the company. The development and implementation of a fatigue management 
strategy for coach drivers is one practical method for a company to 
demonstrate a proactive and strong commitment to safety. Such a strategy 
should be clearly communicated to drivers and carefully integrated with 
existing recruitment and selection practices, workplace health and safety 
strategies, and training policies. Therefore, it is recommended that all drivers 
who are at risk of experiencing occupationally-induced fatigue should be 
provided with access to individually-focused training programs directed at 
assisting them to develop more effective fatigue-management strategies (see 
Machin, 2003 for an example). 
The difficulty of obtaining sufficient respondents should also be 
mentioned. Maxwell (2004) has clearly demonstrated that underpowered 
research runs the risk of failing to detect real relationships and may lead to 
erroneous conclusions. This is especially the case when multiple hypotheses 
are proposed. The solution seems clear: increase the sample size so that 
adequate power is achieved. However, when studying specific populations of 
workers such as coach drivers, it may be practically impossible to recruit 
sufficient numbers of participants, especially if the companies are not willing 
to express strong support for the study or safety issues have a lower priority. 
The researcher has also contacted the Transport Workers Union in order to 
obtain their support for collecting additional data and is currently negotiating 
with them. However, when safety research is conducted outside of large 
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